Amazing article. Will save to explain ZKP to others.
One tiny correction
random.randrange(100) gives 300 possible commitments(3 colors for hundred nonces) After seeing a couple of revealed edges, the verifier can figure out the palette and brute-force all 300 combinations, effectively opening every commitment.
It can be mitigated if we use 128 bits of randomness, e.g. secrets.token_bytes(16).
Also I would use sha256 instead of hash. Python hash is not considered secure as it does not have proper collision resistance.
It’s a new word invented by people who don’t know hashing and databases already exist.
One tiny correction
random.randrange(100) gives 300 possible commitments(3 colors for hundred nonces) After seeing a couple of revealed edges, the verifier can figure out the palette and brute-force all 300 combinations, effectively opening every commitment.
It can be mitigated if we use 128 bits of randomness, e.g. secrets.token_bytes(16).
Also I would use sha256 instead of hash. Python hash is not considered secure as it does not have proper collision resistance.